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ACQUISITION: SHORT-TERM TACTICS AND LONG-TERM CHANGE

Prizes! Innovating, Risk Shifting,
and Avoiding Contracts and Grants
by Steven L. Schooner and Nathaniel E. Castellano

F

rom Columbus’s brash proposal to discover
an Atlantic route to the East Indies, Lewis
and Clark’s epic cross-country expedition to
the Pacific Coast, to the Space Race that first
landed humans on the moon, government
institutions have inspired transformational quests and
pioneering endeavors that slashed the Gordian Knots of
their time.
While innovation occurs constantly—incentivized
by familiar devices such as patents, research grants, public
procurement, and tax deductions—some barriers prove
so stubborn that they demand a different type of incentive, a more dramatic and exciting gesture: a prize.
As early as 1567, European sovereigns offered prizes
for solving the vexing problem of accurately determining
a ship’s longitude at sea. This culminated with the British
Longitude Prize of 1714, brought to modern attention by
Dava Sobel’s bestselling 1995 book, Longitude, The True
Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific
Problem of His Time.

America Competes
Today, prizes have become the darling of the Obama
administration. Exploiting their renewed popularity and
seemingly unlimited potential, President Obama formally encouraged federal agencies to adopt prize contests
in his 2009 Strategy for American Innovation.
Soon after, Congress passed the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, authorizing all
federal agencies to conduct prize contests. By mid-2014,
the federal government had sponsored some 350 prizes,
prompting Professor Steve Kelman of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government to pronounce that prize contests were “one of the single largest changes in government
management in the last decade.”
It’s no surprise that public managers find prizes more
attractive than contracts and grants. Government managers focused on achieving agency missions in an era of

scarce resources crave flexible vehicles that are less subject
to scrutiny. Indeed, we are reminded of the explosion of
“other transactions authority” activity during the 1990’s
acquisition reform efforts.

Shifting the Risk
Prizes differ from contracts and grants because they
shift the risk of failure (meaning, the risk that effort will
be expended with no compensation) to contestants. The
government only awards prizes if and when the government receives the solution it asks for. Rather than agreeing to reimburse the private sector for effort expended in
advancing the state of the art, the government only pays
for success.
Unlike the conventional vehicles they tend to replace—
contracts and grants, which are awarded before the government receives what it asks for—the delay in awarding the
prize until after the contest plays out allows a potentially
innumerable number of contestants to compete and leverages the “theater” of the contest. This provides the government with two distinct advantages not found in other
innovation-incentivizing techniques.
First, the ability to include diverse contestants from
unlimited disciplines, who can introduce novel solutions
to traditional problems, greatly enhances the likelihood of
overcoming seemingly impenetrable performance barriers.
History bolsters this theory. John Harrison, who
solved the centuries-old problem of calculating a ship’s
longitude at sea, was a self-taught clock-maker, not a navigator. Napoleon’s 1795 Food Preservation Prize champion, Nicolas Appert, who created the modern practice of
canning, was a confectioner.

Spurring Private-Sector Interest
The second advantage of prizes is that the very nature of
public competition spurs private-sector interest. Innovators invest their time and energy competing in contests
hoping to reap significant financial rewards, but also
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pursuing the priceless imprimatur of success. Winning a
high-profile government contest garners public attention
of the type that few innovators could attract or afford
through other means.
The winner of the Goldcorp Challenge conceded that,
while the prize barely covered their expenses, “It would
have taken [our company] years to get the recognition in
North America that this [single] project gave us overnight.”
Yet the benefits of prizes do not come without cost.
Allowing more contestants to participate means that, for
every winner, there are vast numbers of disappointed contestants. Given the nature of the research and development process, those disappointed contestants will usually
have invested far more in the contests than they would
expend developing a bid or proposal when seeking a government contract or grant.

And the Loser Is …
History confirms that not all disappointed and emptyhanded contestants walk away quietly. Indeed, the
enduring legacy of the Longitude Prize was the dramatic
decades-long dispute between John Harrison, his heirs,
and the Longitude Board. Unfortunately, amidst the
current euphoria for prizes, nothing suggests that the
government has anticipated prize contest disputes, let
alone provided a straightforward means for contestants
to obtain judicial review, or any form of due process, to
resolve those disputes.
It did not take long for modern-day equivalents to
the Longitude Prize dispute to appear, albeit on a more
modest scale. In April 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) split a $50,000 prize between two contestants in its Robocall Challenge, which sought effective
tools to block automated telephone marketing calls.
When David Frankel’s entrepreneurial invention
failed to win the prize, Frankel contested the FTC’s decision. Dissatisfied with the FTC’s responsiveness, Frankel
filed a bid protest at the Government Accountability Office
(GAO). When GAO dismissed his challenge for lack of
jurisdiction, Frankel then brought suit in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims. More than a year after the contest’s conclusion, the court permitted the litigation to proceed.
Prize contests come in so many different variations
that the outcome of the Robocall Challenge litigation
will not remove the potential for inefficient jurisdictional
litigation to arise from other contests. By failing to waive
its sovereign immunity or designate a dispute resolution
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forum, the government burdens its own lawyers with
defending its right to deny contestants due process, while
saddling disappointed contestants with the onus of finding an adjudicatory forum with jurisdiction, not to mention the uncertainty of not knowing what, if any, due
process might be available.
For now, disappointed contestants may attempt
to bring claims in any number of fora—federal district
courts, the Court of Federal Claims, agency boards of
contract appeals, or the GAO—before the merits of
their claims are acknowledged. At best, this will waste
the government’s and the private sector’s time, energy,
and money. At worst, hiding the jurisdictional ball may
dis-incentivize future participation in prize contests.
We applaud the trail-blazing government officials willing to experiment with prize contests to solve vexing problems in an expeditious, cost-effective manner. Nonetheless,
the government must employ prizes—and consume private
sector resources—responsibly.
Sovereign status does not entitle the government to
act arbitrarily or capriciously. For now, contest-sponsoring
agencies should respect the private sector’s valuable intellectual capacity and scarce resources and incorporate dispute resolution clauses into their competition guidelines. If
the government continues to bury its head in the sand, contestants play the government’s game at their own risk.
Steven L. Schooner is the Nash and Cibinic Professor of government
procurement law at The George Washington University Law School. He
is a director of the Procurement Round Table. He acknowledges Seymour
Herman for his continued support of government procurement law research.
Contact him at sschooner@law.gwu.edu.
Nathaniel E. Castellano is a third-year student at The George Washington
University Law School and a member of the George Washington Law
Review. Contact him at necastellano@law.gwu.edu.

